Här följer en intressant artikel om skuldkrisen i södra Europa. Författaren har i en rad artiklar hävdat att Grekland aldrig kommer att kunna betala sina skulder. I den här artikeln beskriver han hur detta kommer drama kommer att utvecklas.
Utgångspunkten är att Grekland är insolvent, det vill säga inte har förmåga att betala sina skulder, och att befolkningen inte kommer att acceptera de omfattande sparpaket som skulle behövas för att få budgeten i balans, dessutom innebär ju besparingar att ekonomin krymper ytterligare. Politiker i EU vill dock inte i dagsläget framkalla en omfattande skuldnedskrivning eftersom det antagligen skulle utlösa en bankkris i Tyskland, att Europiska centralbanken skulle behöva mer pengar och skuldkrisen skulle kunna spridas till Spanien och Italien. Ingen bra bakgrund för politiker om man vill bli omvald. Återstår då strategin att sopa under mattan, "kicking the can down the road".
Istället för skuldavskrivning i närtid så tror författaren att följande scenario är troligare:
1. Inom kort frivillig "konsolidering", längre återbetalningstid, lägre ränta, viss nedskrivning (2011). Internationella banker drabbas inte i någon större utsträckning, men kan börja bli av med/reservera för utlåning till Grekland och andra länder.
2. Nya lån från IMF och EU, allt färre privata långivare. (2013)
3. Samtidig så går Europeiska banker in för att konsolidera sig och bli av med sina dåliga lån(2011-2015)
4. Än mera lån från IMF och EU(2015)
5. Ohållbar situation, men nu har olika EU tagit över skulderna. Massiv skuldavskrivning, Europeiska centralbanken behöver rekapitaliseras, södra Europa utestängs från kapitalmarknaderna återstår då upplåning via en Euro obligation.(2015)
6. En gemensam skattepolitik har på¨detta sätt införts bakvägen.
Under 1980-talet utspelades ett liknande drama i Latin Amerika. Där tog det sju år från det att problem uppstod till dess att man gjorde de första skuldavskrivningar.
Europe’s long road of tears to fiscal union
By Wolfgang Münchau
Published: April 17 2011 18:39
Last updated: April 17 2011 18:39
I think I now understand how the European Union is planning to resolve the crisis.
As a starting point, I believe that Angela Merkel will honour her pledge not to force debt restructuring until 2013. The German chancellor agreed this formula with President Nicolas Sarkozy of France during their infamous walk on the beaches of Deauville in France.
There is an emerging consensus among policymakers that the Greek public sector debt is not sustainable. For this realisation to look consistent with the Deauville pledge, the most likely route chosen will be a voluntary restructuring that involves a maturity transformation of Greek bonds. A voluntary restructuring is, of course, an oxymoron. The idea is to get a group of large investors into a room and bang heads. The problem is this will almost certainly not be sufficient. This was also the experience of pre-default Argentina where some investors agreed to a rescheduling, while others stayed outside and took a free ride.
In the case of Greece, debt sustainability would require a large restructuring. Standard & Poor’s last week put the necessary size of a “haircut” at between 50 and 70 per cent, given the projected debt level of 160 per cent of gross domestic product.
The main significance of a voluntary scheme is not economic, but political. A token voluntary “bail-in” may persuade the EU and the International Monetary Fund to agree another loan to Greece next year. Greece would badly need such a loan because there is no way it will be strong enough to return to the capital market.
So this could be the sequence: after the initial loan, a token “bail-in” would be followed by another loan. By that time, the exposure of the private sector will be lower than today. The short-term debt will have been fully repaid.
So will there be default on the outstanding amounts in 2013?
I think the same political considerations will apply in 2013 as today. Default would cut the country off the capital markets for several years. It would risk contagion to other countries. It would require a recapitalisation of the European Central Bank and trigger immediate transfer payments under the rescue umbrellas. My hunch would be that the next generation of political leaders will be just as cautious about default in 2013 as they are in 2011. They will give Greece, Ireland and Portugal another bridging loan. By 2015, a large chunk of the peripheral debt will be held by the various EU rescue schemes.
This alone will not make the Greek debt any more sustainable, but it allows some flexibility in debt management. The loans may be extended to 50 years and the interest rate cut. This can continue up to a point where the debt becomes sustainable. The rescue mechanism will end up with all the periphery debt. Its own bonds will serve as a proxy for periphery debt.
Over time, I would expect that the European Council will extend the size and remit of the European Stability Mechanism from the pure backstop it is now towards a proper debt agency.
This may become necessary to stop further contagion. As I argued last week, I expect that Spain’s deflationary adjustment will lead to stress in the housing market, with strong spillovers to the savings banks. I therefore expect a future ESM/IMF programme for the Spanish banking sector.
At that point the focus will shift to Italy. Italy accounts for 18 per cent of the guarantees. I suspect Italy will not be willing to honour its bail-out commitment if and when Spain were to enter the mechanism. Even if Italy were willing, it might not be able to do it, given its own debt sustainability problems. And once Italy defaults on its commitment, I cannot see Germany and France willing to bankroll the entire system unilaterally. At that point, the intra-governmental approach will break down and the eurozone will make the big jump – towards a common European bond.
But is there not a concrete danger of a break-up? Just think of the political dynamics at each link in this chain. The choice today is between crisis resolution, and putting off making a decision. We are doing the latter. In 2013, the choice will be essentially the same.
When it becomes impossible to delay making the hard choices any further, Germany and France face the choice between an implosion of the eurozone, or taking a deep breath and accepting a eurozone bond. My guess is that, having delayed and then delayed again in making the difficult decision they will do the right thing eventually. It is not that they want this particular outcome. They will simply make the choice of least resistance at each junction, and end up at this point.
There is, I admit, the possibility of a big game-changing unexpected intervention. Ms Merkel may be serious about the Deauville commitment, but a revolt in the German or Greek parliament, or some other shock, may force a default. I cannot deny the possibility that the Greeks will blink first. But I am sticking with this scenario.
Is this a good outcome? If you oppose the eurozone bond in principle, then surely you will be horrified by this sequence. If you support the idea, you may still not like it. It is the most toxic route imaginable towards a fiscal union. But it may be the only one.
munchau@eurointelligence.com
